报告题目【Practical Backward-Secure Searchable Encryption from Symmetric Puncturable Encryption】
时间：2019年04月11日(星期四)15:00
地点：仓山校区成功楼603报告厅
主讲：莫纳什大学副教授，Joseph Liu
主办：数学与信息学院, 福建省网络安全与密码技术重点实验室
参加对象：计算机专业相关的教师和学生
报告人简介：Joseph Liu is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University. He got his PhD from the Chinese University of Hong Kong at 2004. Prior to joining Monash at 2015, he has worked as a research scientist at Institute for Infocomm Research (I2R) in Singapore for more than 7 years. His research areas include cyber security, blockchain, IoT security, applied cryptography and privacy enhanced technology. He has received more than 5500 citations and his H-index is 42. He has established the Monash Blockchain Research Lab at October 2017 and serves as the director since then. His remarkable research in linkable ring signature forms the theory basis of Monero (XMR), one of the largest cryptocurrencies in the world. He has been given the Dean's Award for Excellence in Research Impact in 2018, and the prestigious ICT Researcher of the Year 2018 Award by the Australian Computer Society (ACS), the largest professional body in Australia representing the ICT sector, for his contribution to the blockchain and cyber security community.
报告摘要：Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) has received wide attention due to its practical application in searching on encrypted data. Beyond search, data addition and deletion are also supported in dynamic SSE schemes. Unfortunately, these update operations leak some information of updated data. To address this issue, forward-secure SSE is actively explored to protect the relations of newly updated data and previously searched keywords. On the contrary, little work has been done in backward security, which enforces that search should not reveal information of deleted data.
In this talk, we propose the first practical and non-interactive backward-secure SSE scheme. In particular, we introduce a new form of symmetric encryption, named "symmetric puncturable encryption" (SPE), and construct a generic primitive from simple cryptographic tools. Based on this primitive, we then present a backward-secure SSE scheme that can revoke a server's searching ability on deleted data. We instantiate our scheme with a practical puncturable pseudorandom function and implement it on a large dataset. The experimental results demonstrate its efficiency and scalability. Compared to the state-of-the-art, our scheme achieves a speedup of almost 50 times in search latency, and a saving of 62% in server storage consumption.